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| 1 | UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE |
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| 4 | BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS |
| 5 | AND INTERFERENCES |
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| 8 | Ex parte DAVID S. SPRINGER and BRIAN T. ZUCKER |
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| 10 | |
| 11 | Appeal 2007-4207 |
| 12 | Application 09/313,436 |
| 13 | Technology Center 3600 |
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| 16 | Decided: February 21, 2008 |
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| | e JENNIFER D. BAHR, ANTON W. FETTING, and STEVEN D.A ARTHY, Administrative Patent Judges. |
| 21FETT | TNG, Administrative Patent Judge. |
| | |
| 22 | DECISION ON APPEAL |

23 STATEMENT OF CASE

- David S. Springer and Brian T. Zucker (Appellants) seek review under 2535 U.S.C. § 134 of a Final rejection of claims 1, 4-6, 8, 9, and 26-31, the only 26claims pending in the application on appeal.
- We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 35 U.S.C. \S 6(b) (2002).

We AFFIRM. 1

- 2 The Appellants invented an advertising scheme that allows a computer user to 3benefit from viewing banner advertising by providing incentives for information 4transmitted to and from a computer server (Specification 2:12-15).
- An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of exemplary 6claims 1, 8 and 26, which are reproduced below [bracketed matter and some 7paragraphing added].
- 1. A method of tracking information provided to a computer system 8
- from an advertisement database and a server accessed by a computer 9
- 10 manufacturer, the method comprising:
- 11 [1] providing an identifier unique to the computer system, the
- identifier being imbedded in one of the computer hardware and 12 13 firmware in the computer system:
- [2] the database associating the identifier with information specific to 14
- a computer user associated with the computer system; 15
- [3] the computer user establishing a web connection with the server 16
- and transmitting the identifier to the database: 17
- 18 [4] the user logging on to a combination advertisement broker server:
- 19 [5] the computer system transmitting the identifier and requesting that
- a banner advertisement be displayed on the computer system; 20
- 21 [6] the database checking for the identifier:
- [7] a counter accounting for the presence of the identifier; and 22
- [8] based on the number of times the database locates the identifier, 23
- the database: 24

| 1 2 | determining which advertisements have been transmitted to the user; and |
|----------|---|
| 3 | based on the computer user associated with the identifier |
| 4 5 | receiving a predetermined number of advertisements in a time period, |
| 6 | the computer user associated with the identifier: |
| 7 8 | receiving discounts on advertised computer components from the manufacturer. |
| 9 | 8. The method of Claim 1 wherein the identifier is one of |
| 10 | a system code, |
| 11 | a system code stored in nonvolatile memory, |
| 12 | a unique ID from a microprocessor, |
| 13 | a unique ID from a peripheral device and |
| 14 | a unique identifier stored on a hard drive. |
| 15 16 | 26. A method for tracking information to a computer system from a server accessed by a computer manufacturer comprising: |
| 17 | [1] providing an identifier unique to the computer system; |
| 18 19 | [2] providing a database associating the identifier with information specific to a computer user; |
| 20 | [3] the user logging on to a combination advertisement broker server; |
| 21 22 | [4] the computer system transmitting the identifier and requesting that a banner advertisement be displayed on the computer system; |
| 23 | [5] the database checking for the identifier; |
| 24 | [6] a counter accounting for the presence of the identifier; and |
| 25 26 | [7] based on the number of times the database locates the identifier, the database; |
| 27 28 | determining which advertisements have been transmitted to the user; and |

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- based on the computer user associated with the identifier 1 receiving a predetermined number of advertisements in a time 2 period. 3 4 the computer user associated with the identifier: 5 receiving discounts on advertised computer components from the manufacturer. 6 7 This appeal arises from the Examiner's Final Rejection, mailed July 20, 2005. 8The Appellants filed an Appeal Brief in support of the appeal on April 27, 2006. 9An Examiner's Answer to the Appeal Brief was mailed on July 17, 2006. A Reply
- 11 PRIOR ART

10Brief was filed on September 13, 2006.

12 The Examiner relies upon the following prior art:

| Marsh | US 5,848,397 | Dec. 8, 1998 |
|---------|-----------------|---------------|
| Guyot | US 6,119,098 | Sep. 12, 2000 |
| Jenkins | US 6,285,983 B1 | Sep. 4, 2001 |

13 REJECTIONS

- 14 Claims 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 26-28, 30, and 31 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) 15as unpatentable over Guyot and Jenkins.
- 16 Claims 6 and 29 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over 17Guyot, Jenkins, and Marsh.
- 18 ISSUES
- 19 The issues pertinent to this appeal are

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- Whether the Appellants have sustained their burden of showing that the
- 2 Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 26-28, 30, and 31 under 35
- 3 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Guyot and Jenkins.
- Whether the Appellants have sustained their burden of showing that the
- 5 Examiner erred in rejecting claims 6 and 29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
- 6 unpatentable over Guyot, Jenkins, and Marsh.
- 7 The pertinent issues turn on whether the art describes or suggests using an 8identifier imbedded in one of the computer hardware and firmware in the computer 9system.

10 FACTS PERTINENT TO THE ISSUES

- 11 The following enumerated Findings of Fact (FF) are believed to be supported 12by a preponderance of the evidence.
- 13 Facts Related to Claim Construction
- The disclosure contains no lexicographic definition of "imbed."
- The ordinary and customary meaning of "imbed" is to fix firmly, enclose snugly, or cause to be an integral part.
- 17 Facts Related to Appellants' Disclosure
- 3. The Specification describes storing an identifier on a hard drive(Specification 5:15-18).
- 20 Guyot

 $10^{1}\,\mbox{American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language}$ (4th ed. 2000).

- Guyot is directed to targeting and distributing advertisements over a
 distributed information network, such as the internet. Guyot provides a
 client application that runs on a subscriber's computer and a server that
 manages an advertisement database and that provides advertisements to
 the client application that are targeted to each individual subscriber,
 based on a personal profile provided by that subscriber (Guyot 1:56-65).
- 5. Guyot exchanges information between the server and the subscriber system, with the server and each of the subscriber systems having a unique identifier (Guyot 3:17-22).
- 6. Guyot's processor assigns credits to the subscriber based on the number 10 of advertisements the subscriber has been exposed to. This information 11 may then be used to provide remuneration to the subscriber based on the 12 number of advertisements displayed on the subscriber system. A total 13 credit amount indicator presents the number of credits the subscriber has 14 15 earned over a predetermined period of time. The processor sends the total credit amount information to the server when a connection is 16 17 established with the server (Guyot 6:6-16).
 - Guyot's Subscriber Statistics are valid for a predetermined period of time (Guyot 6:50-51).

20 Jenkins

 Jenkins is directed to a marketing system for directing customized offers to consumers that includes a classes database derived from an

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| 1 | abstraction of the individual records database and second |
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| 2 | communications facilities that provide access by marketers to the |
| 3 | marketing server (Jenkins 2:55-65). |
| 4 | 9. Jenkins describes in background that data-driven marketing in general |

- and direct marketing in particular have increasingly taken advantage of
 expanded electronic marketing, including, for example, offerings
 directed to individuals through e-mail accounts and the use of web
 browser cookie files to target web page banner ads. As is known in the
 art, cookie files² may be installed by a web site server on the computer
- art, cookie files² may be installed by a web site server on the comput
 hard disk drive of a browsing consumer.
- 11 Facts Related To Differences Between The Claimed Subject Matter And The 12Prior Art
- 13 10.One of ordinary skill knew that computer manufacturers advertised and
 promoted their products, including computer components.
- 11. One of ordinary skill knew that discounts were a widely used and
 predictable form of product promotion.
- 17 Facts Related To The Level Of Skill In The Art
- 12. Neither the Examiner nor the Appellants has addressed the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent arts of tracking items and data formatting. We will therefore consider the cited prior art as representative of the
- 15² As is well known, "[a] cookie is arbitrary data that a server provides to a browser 16in order to uniquely identify that user upon subsequent access to the server."

- level of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d
 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[T]he absence of specific findings on the
 level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error 'where the
 prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is
 not shown'") (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp.,
- 6 807 F.2d 955, 963 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
- 7 Facts Related To Secondary Considerations
- 8 13. There is no evidence on record of secondary considerations of non-
- 9 obviousness for our consideration.

10 PRINCIPLES OF LAW

11Claim Construction

- During examination of a patent application, pending claims are given 13their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification. *In* 14re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05 (CCPA 1969); *In re Am. Acad. of Sci.* 15Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364, (Fed. Cir. 2004).
- Limitations appearing in the specification but not recited in the claim are not 17 read into the claim. *E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp.*, 343 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. 18Cir. 2003) (claims must be interpreted "in view of the specification" without 19 importing limitations from the specification into the claims unnecessarily)
- 20 Although a patent applicant is entitled to be his or her own lexicographer of 21patent claim terms, in *ex parte* prosecution it must be within limits. *In re Corr*, 22347 F.2d 578, 580 (CCPA 1965). The applicant must do so by placing such

Idefinitions in the Specification with sufficient clarity to provide a person of 2 ordinary skill in the art with clear and precise notice of the meaning that is to be 3 construed. See also In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (although 4 an inventor is free to define the specific terms used to describe the invention, this 5 must be done with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision; where an 6 inventor chooses to give terms uncommon meanings, the inventor must set out any 7 uncommon definition in some manner within the patent disclosure so as to give 8 one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the change).

9Obviousness

- A claimed invention is unpatentable if the differences between it and the 11prior art are "such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at 12the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art." 1335 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000); KSR Int'l v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007); 14Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1966).
- In *Graham*, the Court held that that the obviousness analysis is bottomed on 16several basic factual inquiries: "[(1)] the scope and content of the prior art are to be 17determined; [(2)] differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be 18ascertained; and [(3)] the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved." 383 19U.S. at 17. *See also KSR Int'l v. Teleflex Inc.*, 127 S.Ct. at 1734. "The 20combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be 21obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results." *KSR*, at 1739.
- "When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and 23other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or in a

Idifferent one. If a person of ordinary skill in the art can implement a predictable 2 variation. § 103 likely bars its patentability." *Id.* at 1740.

- 3 "For the same reason, if a technique has been used to improve one device, 4and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve 5similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual 6application is beyond his or her skill." *Id*.
- 7 "Under the correct analysis, any need or problem known in the field of 8endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason 9for combining the elements in the manner claimed." *Id.* at 1742.

10 ANALYSIS

- 11 Claims 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 26-28, 30, and 31 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
 12 unpatentable over Guyot and Jenkins.
- 13 The Appellants argue these claims as a group.
- 14 Accordingly, we select claim 26 as representative of the group. 1537 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2007).
- 16 The Examiner found that Guyot described all of the limitations of claim 26, 17except those of having the party accessing the server be a computer manufacturer, 18and having the discounts be associated with computer components from the 19manufacturer. The Examiner implicitly found that such a computer manufacturer 20would have been a predictable advertiser in Guyot's system, and that discounts on 21what the manufacturer sold would be predictable species of Guyot's credits with 22such an advertiser. The Examiner further found, as to the claims additionally

1 requiring an imbedded identifier as with claim 1, that Jenkins described an 2 example of an imbedded identifier as a cookie (Answer 3-6).

- The Appellants contend that Jenkins' cookie does not contain an identifier 4imbedded in a system hardware or software component during manufacture (Br. 511:Fourth ¶), and that Guyot does not describe a computer manufacturer and 6discounts by such a manufacturer (Br. 11:Fifth ¶). The Appellants further argue 7that neither Guyot nor Jenkins describes the desirability of the combination 8because, in particular, cookies are undesirable in such a combination (Br. 12).
- 9 We disagree. As to whether either reference describes computer manufacturers 10as advertisers or discounts on computer components, or suggests the desirability of 11the combination of the references.
- 12 [t]he obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic
- conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by
- overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit
- content of issued patents. The diversity of inventive pursuits and of
- modern technology counsels against limiting the analysis in this way.
- In many fields it may be that there is little discussion of obvious
- techniques or combinations, and it often may be the case that market
- 19 demand, rather than scientific literature, will drive design trends.
- 20 KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741. Further,
- When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives
- 22 and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same
- field or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can implement a
- 24 predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.
- 25 id. at 1740. Guyot distributes advertisements using a client application that 26runs on a subscriber's computer and a server that manages an advertisement

Idatabase and that provides advertisements to the client application that are targeted 2to each individual subscriber, based on a personal profile provided by that 3subscriber (FF). As pointed out by the Examiner (Answer 5), a computer 4manufacturer is a predictable embodiment of Guyot's advertiser, whose advertising 5would be driven by market forces.

- 6 Guyot assigns credits to its subscriber based on the number of advertisements
 7the subscriber has been exposed to. This information may then be used to provide
 8remuneration to the subscriber based on the number of advertisements displayed on
 9the subscriber system. A total credit amount indicator presents the number of
 10credits the subscriber has earned over a predetermined period of time (FF). We
 11find that discounts are a predictable embodiment of Guyot's remuneration since a
 12discount is a widely practiced form of promotion, again driven by market forces.
 13We further find that such discounts would likely pertain to items or services sold
 14by the discounter for the simple reason that discounts are with respect to sales,
 15which in the case of a computer manufacturer would include computer
- 17 The remaining arguments by the Appellants regarding the limitation of 18 imbedding an identifier are moot with respect to claim 26, because claim 26 is a 19 method claim and contains no structural limitation regarding the imbedding of an 20 identifier. Thus, the Appellant has not sustained its burden of showing that the 21 Examiner erred in rejecting claims 26-28, 30, and 31.
- 22 Although the Appellants argued the claims as a group and we have found the 23Appellants have not sustained their burden as to representative claim 26, we will

laddress the Appellants' arguments in support of claim 1. To do so, we must next 2construe the limitation "identifier being imbedded in one of the computer hardware 3and firmware in the computer system." The word "imbed" is not lexicographically 4defined by the disclosure. The common meaning of the verb "imbed" within the 5context of an item of data such as an identifier is "to fix firmly" (FF &). 6Therefore we construe the limitation of "identifier being imbedded in one of the 7computer hardware and firmware in the computer system" as "identifier being 8fixed firmly in one of the computer hardware and firmware in the computer 9system."

- Guyot describes relying on a unique identifier (FF). Jenkins describes one 11technique for providing such an identifier, a cookie, as a data element stored on a 12hard drive (FF). Thus the issue becomes whether storing an identifier as a cookie 13on a hard drive provides an identifier fixed firmly in one of the computer hardware 14and firmware in the computer system. We find that the Appellants' disclosure 15describes storing an identifier on a hard drive (FF) and that claim 8, which 16depends from claim 1, embraces an embodiment including an identifier stored on a 17hard drive. Thus, the Appellants' disclosure supports construing the scope of 18claim 1 to include identifiers stored on a hard drive and claim 8 requires that the 19scope of claim 1 be broad enough to encompass an identifier stored on a hard 20drive.
- 21 We now turn to the Appellants' argument that cookies present well known 22problems, *viz.* cookies do not automatically identify the client computer's owner to 23enable advertising revenue sharing; do not automatically allow any correlation

1between the computer's owner and his individual preferences for targeted 2advertising; and are lacking in desirable security features because they can be 3easily altered, deleted, disabled or copied to multiple computers (Br. 12). We find 4that whether such problems exist is moot because claim 1 does not require 5identifying the computer's owner, or a correlation between the computer's owner 6and the owner's preferences, or any security features.

- The Appellants have not sustained their burden of showing that the Examiner 8 erred in rejecting claims 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 26-28, 30, and 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as 9 unpatentable over Guyot and Jenkins.
- 10 Claims 6 and 29 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Guyot,

 11 Jenkins and Marsh
- 12 The Appellants have relied upon the arguments for the patentability of claim 1, 13supra, which we found to be insufficient to meet the Appellants' burden.

 14Therefore, the Appellants have not sustained their burden of showing that the 15Examiner erred in rejecting claims 6 and 29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as 16unpatentable over Guyot, Jenkins, and Marsh.

17 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

18 The Appellants have not sustained their burden of showing that the Examiner 19erred in rejecting claims 1, 4-6, 8, 9, and 26-31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as 20unpatentable over the prior art.

| DECISION |
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| To summarize, our decision is as follows: |
| • The rejection of claims 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 26-28, 30, and 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Guyot and Jenkins is sustained. |
| • The rejection of claims 6 and 29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Guyot, Jenkins, and Marsh is sustained. |
| No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal by be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). |
| |
| AFFIRMED |
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| G AVID L. MCCOMBS AYNES & BOONE LLP 1 MAIN STREET JITE 3100 ALLAS, TX 75202-3789 |
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